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Abstract Some electoral systems favor strong single-party majority governments, while 
others the formation of coalitions. Having one or the other is likely to affect economic out-
comes in ways that are unintended when the electoral rules are approved. In this paper, we 
show that government fragmentation has large fiscal implications. We also provide results 
that have a causal interpretation. Using a panel of Spanish municipalities, along with a 
close-elections regression discontinuity design, we find that single-party majorities run 
budgets with a 1.5% point larger primary surplus than that of coalitions. In addition, we 
show that lower deficits are driven mainly by single-party majority governments’ capacity 
to raise more revenues. These findings are robust to several model specifications.
Keywords Fiscal deficit · Single-party majority government · Coalitions · Regression 
discontinuity
JEL Classification C21 · D72 · D78 · H72
1 Introduction
Are single-party majority governments more likely to run larger surpluses than coa-
lition governments? Previous research on parliamentary democracies has argued 
that government fragmentation matters in explaining fiscal outcomes, as incumbents 
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have different incentives to negotiate over spending policies when their party holds a 
majority than when they need the support of other parties in the legislature to pass the 
budget (e.g., Roubini and Sachs 1989). Despite the considerable amount of research 
devoted to that question, no consensus has emerged in the empirical literature about 
whether the claim holds. The lack of consensus is explained partly by the identification 
problems that arise when estimating the causal effects of political variables that are 
endogenous to fiscal outcomes. In this paper, we tackle that problem using a regression 
discontinuity framework and close elections as our source of exogenous variation.
Since Lee (2008), the close-elections approach has been applied successfully in 
studying the causal effects on policies and public spending of various explanatory vari-
ables, such as the ideology of the incumbent party (Pettersson-Lidbom 2008; Leigh 
2008; Folke 2014; Curto-Grau et  al. 2012), the ethnicity of the head of government 
(Hopkins and McCabe 2012), female quotas (Casas-Arce and Saiz 2014), electoral 
rules (Gagliarducci et al. 2011), the size of the legislature (Pettersson-Lidbom 2012), 
and the wage paid to politicians (Gagliarducci and Nannicini 2013). However, despite 
the key role that government fragmentation plays in much of the theoretical literature, 
very little of the existing research develops adequate identification strategies for ana-
lyzing the question at hand empirically. To our knowledge, only Freier and Odendahl 
(2012) adopts a similar strategy.
The close-elections approach is appropriate for studying the effects of government 
fragmentation because the probability of having a single-party majority changes dis-
continuously after one party wins more than half of the seats in the legislature. The 
discontinuous change in the probability of one-party control provides an econometric 
opening for adopting a regression discontinuity design. In elections in which the win-
ning party is very close to the 50%-seat threshold, being on one side or the other is 
determined by just a few votes and thus can be considered to be random events, pro-
vided that several identifying assumptions are met (see Hahn et al. 2001 or Imbens and 
Lemieux 2008).
We apply the regression discontinuity design to a panel of Spanish local govern-
ments from 2003 to 2010. By using observations at the local government level, we are 
able to hold constant many institutional features over time and across space. Another 
advantage is that our database includes many local governments in which the type of 
government—single-party majority or coalition—was decided by a small vote margin, 
which supplies useful variation and provides enough power to run a battery of checks.
We show that single-party majority governments run budget surpluses that are 
around 1.5% points larger than coalition governments do. That result provides sup-
port for the literature arguing that majorities lead to stronger fiscal discipline. We also 
extend previous literature by showing that the expectation that single-party majorities 
exercise more fiscal discipline at the country level likewise holds at the local level. 
While other studies reach the same conclusion, our regression discontinuity estimates 
improve upon the current literature both by being more internally valid and delivering 
causal interpretations. In addition, we show that the mechanism through which single-
party majority governments have smaller budget deficits is larger revenues, and not 
less spending. While we do not claim that the results reported herein are generalizable 
to all settings, together with recent related work that reaches similar conclusions (e.g., 
Freier and Odendahl 2012), they do challenge the conventional wisdom regarding the 
mechanisms through which single-party majorities achieve stronger fiscal discipline.
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2  Government fragmentation and fiscal outcomes
A large theoretical literature argues that when several parties are involved in passing the 
budget—either coalition partners or parties in the legislature—the actors involved in the 
negotiation will condition the agreement on the inclusion of spending programs that favor 
their constituencies, leading to overspending and budget deficits (Weingast et  al. 1981). 
The rationale for that hypothesis comes from a utility-maximization argument in which 
each party involved in the negotiation demands a level of spending such that the marginal 
utility of spending received by the constituency represented by the party or legislator is 
equal to own marginal cost. If the additional targeted spending gained during the negotia-
tion process is financed by taxes levied on all taxpayers and not only on those in the con-
stituency of the party, each party will demand a level of spending higher than what they 
would demand if the additional taxes were paid just by taxpayers in their constituency. This 
framework—the common pool problem (or concentrated benefits, diffused costs)—has 
been applied to the study of overspending and deficits in legislatures (Shepsle and Wein-
gast 1981; Bradbury and Crain 2001), federal countries (Rodden 2002, 2003), bureaucra-
cies (Tang 1991), and local organizations (Jordahl and Liang 2010; Hansen 2014), among 
others.
On the empirical side, existing studies provide inconclusive evidence regarding whether 
majorities do in fact lead to smaller fiscal deficits. The results depend on data availability, 
how variables are defined, and the statistical models employed. Roubini and Sachs (1989) 
offered a first empirical test of the hypothesis using cross-country observations and ordi-
nary least squares regressions. They found a positive association between government frag-
mentation and fiscal deficits in their sample of OECD countries. Similar results were found 
in other studies, such as Edin and Ohlsson (1991), Borrelli and Royed (1995), Franzese 
(2000), Volkerink and De Haan (2001) and Balassone and Giordano (2001), among oth-
ers. In a similar vein, other papers also found that more fragmented governments seem to 
be less prone to introducing fiscal adjustments in response to adverse economic shocks 
(Alesina and Drazen 1989).1
Other scholars, however, do not find systematic relationships between governmental 
fragmentation and fiscal outcomes (de Haan and Sturm 1994, 1997; Harrinvirta and Mattila 
2001; Woo 2003; Ricciuti 2004). Sakamoto (2001) even finds that, if anything, deficits are 
smaller under weak governments (and coalition governments are included among them). 
De Haan et al. (1999) focus more specifically on the extent to which coalition members are 
able to cooperate in responses to adverse economic shocks by adopting fiscal adjustment 
measures. They do not find any evidence that multiparty governments have more difficulty 
in running balanced budgets. Finally, Blais et al. (2010) find that coalition governments are 
less prone to deficits and more biased towards the status quo, because each member of a 
coalition has veto power.
Some recent papers focus on single-country analyses of subnational levels of govern-
ment. An important advantage of using subnational data is that budgeting institutions are 
usually the same for all units under consideration. As Ashworth and Heyndels (2005) argue, 
that similar institutional structures avoid omitted country-level variable biases as well as 
allowing research on larger samples. Borge (2005)—for Norwegian municipalities—or 
1 There is also an institutional literature that analyses how electoral systems impact fiscal policies and out-
comes, partially through the impact of electoral rules on the number of parties and their incentives (Persson 
and Tabellini 2004; Iversen and Soskice 2006; Jurado and Leon 2017).
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Artés and Jurado (2015)—for the Spanish case—find a positive effect of government frag-
mentation on budget deficits. However, Schaltegger and Feld (2009), who analyze Swiss 
Cantons, provide more nuanced results and find only that the size of the cabinet affects 
positively the size of expenditure, regardless of being formed by coalitions or not. Like-
wise, Jochimsen and Nuscheler (2011)—for the German case—and Rattsø and Tovmo 
(2002)—for Danish local governments—do not find that governmental fragmentation has 
any negative effects on fiscal performance.
Apart from the inconclusiveness surrounding the effects of single-party majorities and 
coalitions on deficits, we also find empirical disagreement with respect to their effects 
on revenues and expenditure. The established theoretical argument in the common pool 
resource literature is that coalitions produce budget deficits because they spend more than 
single-party governments (see, for example, Weingast et  al. 1981). The main underlying 
argument is that all coalition members target spending to their constituencies and that such 
targeting greases the coalition’s wheels. The relevant literature argues that when several 
parties need to agree on a budget they will do it by accepting some spending according to 
all coalition member preferences. That theoretical argument has been validated empirically 
by, among many others, Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006), Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) and 
Velasco (1999, 2000), with national-level data, and Le Maux et al. (2011) and Baskaran 
(2013) with subnational data.2
However, other research does not find clear-cut results regarding the effects on govern-
mental expenditure. Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) find that fragmentation could have an 
impact on both expenditures and revenues. Ashworth and Heyndels (1999, 2001) find a 
correlation between persistent tax structures and coalition governments. Goeminne et al. 
(2008) reach similar findings and argue that fragmented governments tend systematically 
to be more optimistic than one-party governments about expected revenue levels. As pass-
ing a budget is more difficult when several actors need to agree on it, easing the ‘war of 
attrition’ through optimistic assessments of future revenues may be a necessary strategy 
for an agreement to be reached. All of this work points to other mechanisms by which 
single-party majority governments could run smaller deficits (or larger surpluses) than coa-
lition governments. Given the mixed empirical findings, we intend to address empirically 
the effect of government fragmentation on public budget deficits and examine the different 
paths to fiscal balance: higher taxes, lower spending, or both.
We argue that the lack of conclusive findings in the field of public finance may be 
methodological.3 Previous research predominantly draws upon time-series-cross-sectional 
approaches, usually including country fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity 
at the national level. Apart from the limitations of relying just on fixed effects when the 
variables of interest are time-invariant (Plümper and Troeger 2007), the main problem of 
estimating the effect of government fragmentation on fiscal outcomes is that fragmentation 
is not chosen randomly and, in fact, can be endogenous to fiscal behavior. It is reasonable 
to think that if a party in government spends more, a single-party majority may become 
more likely. On the other hand, one could also argue that more diverse societies, where the 
2 Alt and Lowry (1994) make a similar argument for US states when each legislative chamber is controlled 
by a different party.
3 Other research has tried to explain the inconclusiveness of the empirical results by focusing on the spe-
cific conditions under which fragmented governments yield more unbalanced fiscal outcomes. Those stud-
ies take into account variables such as the number of ministers with spending powers (Perotti and Konto-
poulos 2002), or the fragmentation of the opposition (Falcó-Gimeno and Jurado 2011), among others.
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needs of different groups with different interests can be satisfied only by engaging in more 
diverse spending policies, coalition governments are more likely to formed. Similarly, defi-
cits are more frequent in times of economic recession and coalition governments might be 
more likely if citizens punish an incumbent majority party for bad economic outcomes.
Thus, to trace a causal relation between coalition governments and budget deficits 
our research design should take the foregoing possibilities into account. Given that valid 
instruments fulfilling all necessary econometric conditions rarely are found, a preferable 
approach is to use quasi-experimental research strategies (Imbens and Lemieux 2008). 
Artés and Jurado (2015) apply several matching methods to study the impact on budget def-
icits of governmental fragmentation and show that those methods improve the precisions 
of the estimates over traditional regression models. However, matching methods do not 
allow controlling for unobserved differences between jurisdictions that elect governments 
of different types, which makes it difficult to interpret matching estimates as causal. In this 
paper, we study fiscal outcomes in Spanish municipalities using a regression discontinuity 
design. We take advantage of the fact that the likelihood that a party forms government 
and passes the budget on its own changes sharply when the most voted party wins 50% + 1 
of the total seats. This method recently has been applied successfully to study the impact 
of different electoral and government variables on spending (see, for instance, Pettersson-
Lidbom 2008, 2012; Leigh 2008; Hopkins and McCabe 2012; Gagliarducci et al. 2011). 
The advantage of our approach is that when certain conditions are met, the accuracy of 
estimates of the effects of interest are similar to those of experimental studies (Green et al. 
2009). Therefore, our key contribution to the literature on the relationship between govern-
ment fragmentation and deficits is to provide results that have a causal interpretation.
3  Empirical strategy
3.1  The Spanish case
To test the effect of governmental fragmentation on fiscal outcomes, our analysis draws 
upon a sample of Spanish municipalities. Although Spanish municipalities receive non-
trivial shares of their revenues in the form of transfers from national and regional govern-
ments, their taxing powers extend over several policy areas, such as taxes on business, real 
estate and motor vehicles. In addition, they have relevant spending powers, particularly in 
areas such as social care, security, environment protection, waste collection and water sup-
ply. Municipal spending amounts to around 14% of total national public spending. Apart 
from their broad spending and revenue capacities, Spanish local governments also have the 
right to borrow (both short—and long-term credit) and, until recently, no balanced budget 
rules were in place.4 Thus, during the period of our analysis, municipalities have room to 
raise or lower their spending, taxes, or both.
Municipalities in Spain operate as small parliamentary democracies. Local elections 
take place in May every 4 years. Citizens vote for a closed party list in a single district with 
4 Local governments did have limits on their total debt capacity in the past. Legislative Decree RDL 2/2007 
established some budgetary principles as a result of the European Union’s Stability and Growth Pact, which 
proclaimed support for fiscal stability. In practice, however, governments could not ex ante avoid fiscal defi-
cits and could only exceptionally sanction local governments generating unsustainable levels of debt accu-
mulation.
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a representation threshold of a 5% vote share. Councilors are allocated among parties that 
surpass the threshold according to D’Hondt’s rule. All elected councilors form the local 
assembly. This local assembly chooses a mayor from among its councilors in an investi-
ture vote that requires a support of the majority of members of the assembly. Thus, if the 
winning party wins a majority on its own, it will be able to form government just with the 
vote of its councilors. If no party has a majority, either some parties form a coalition, or, 
if no agreement is reached between the parties represented in the assembly, the leader of 
the party receiving the most votes will be elected mayor and will rule in minority, gather-
ing each year the necessary votes to pass the budget. The electoral calendar is fixed and 
local governments cannot call an early election. That is a very relevant institutional feature 
for our analysis, as it implies that when no party reaches a single-party majority of coun-
cilors, they cannot dissolve the local assembly. They will be required to continue seeking 
an agreement with the other parties (either with support in the local assembly or with par-
ties joining the government in a coalition) to pass the budget as many times as necessary 
until the next election arrives.
The foregoing discussion means that, in practice and with respect to budgets we can 
separate municipal governments into two types: (1) single-party majorities, those where 
one party can pass the budget on its own, and (2) coalitions, in which the mayor’s party 
needs the support of other parties—which may or may not be formally part of the govern-
ment—to pass a budget. In our analysis, we will use single-party majorities as our treat-
ment and coalitions as our control group.
The period of our analyses spans from 2003 to 2010; it covers two complete electoral 
cycles: 2003–2006 (elections in May 2003), and 2007–2010 (elections in May 2007). Our 
analysis thus coincides with the peaking and bursting of Spain’s housing bubble, strad-
dling a period of growth and a period of fiscal adjustment and consolidation. We take those 
events into account in our estimations by entering electoral term dummies and controls for 
economic activity. The dataset helps generalize the results because they are not driven by 
either good or bad economic times.5
3.2  Sample
In order to estimate our model, we need: (1) local-level data on fiscal outcomes, (2) elec-
toral results and, (3) local-level socio-demographic control variables. We collected fiscal 
data from the original source at the Spanish Ministry of Public Administration and com-
puted average values for the two main periods of analysis: the 2003–2006 and 2007–2010 
electoral terms.6 Official data on local elections are available from the Spanish Ministry 
of Internal Affairs. This database contains information on the votes and seats won by 
each political party in each municipality and in each election. The database also contains 
information on the number of valid votes, eligible voting population and total population. 
Additional covariates were obtained from the Anuario Económico de La Caixa, a database 
5 Running non-parametric regression discontinuity models for each term separately yields consistent treat-
ment effects, indicating that the results are not driven by a specific period.
6 This database contains information on all revenues and expenditures for each Spanish municipality over 
the period from 2001 to 2012. However, as the electoral term is our unit of analysis, we have complete four-
year data only for the 2003–2006 and 2007–2010 electoral terms. In the Appendix, we report results that 
both code the terms differently and that run the analysis splitting the sample by term.
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containing information on local economic conditions in Spanish municipalities of more 
than 1000 inhabitants since 1997.
As the electoral data are invariant across years within electoral terms, we use the mean 
value for each variable over the electoral term. After merging the data, our final sample 
consists of a panel of 5871 observations drawing upon 3147 Spanish municipalities of 
more than 1000 inhabitants over the 2003–2010 period.7 Approximately half of all the 
observations in our estimating sample contain values for the majority party vote margin—
our main forcing variable—that lie within a 10% interval around the cut-off point. In addi-
tion, many of the elections that were decided by small percentages of votes operated under 
a different type of government from one election to the other. In particular, of the 13.5% 
of the observations that lie within the ± 3% majority vote margin interval, 30% of them 
switched from a single-party majority government to a coalition, or vice versa, between the 
two electoral terms. That switching provides useful variation for our purposes and gives us 
enough power to run a variety of checks. Summary statistics for all the variables are pro-
vided in Table 1.
3.3  Dependent variable
Since our analysis speaks to the empirical literature stemming from Roubini and Sachs 
(1989), which argues that single-party majority governments will lead to more fiscal disci-
pline, primary municipal budget surplus is our main dependent variable. We compute pri-
mary surplus as the difference between total revenues and expenditures (excluding interest 
payments on the debt) in each municipality as a percentage of total revenues.8 We standard-
ize by revenues because no measures of local GDP are available for Spanish municipalities. 
Table 1  Descriptive statistics
Variable Observations Mean SD Min Max
Primary Surplus (as a percentage of revenues) 5871 2.21 7.36 − 67.92 46.36
Ln expenditures 5871 6.80 0.37 1.87 8.65
Ln revenues 5871 8.90 0.37 5.57 8.70
Single-party majority government 5871 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00
Majority margin 5871 0.08 0.18 − 0.32 0.99
Population 5871 14,465 76,032.22 912.25 3,218,682
Right government 5871 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00
Left government 5871 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00
Unemployment 5788 7.15 3.31 0.92 26.25
Population density 5760 417.71 1374.25 0.00 22,076.75
Age structure (15–65%) 5792 0.35 0.05 0.19 0.56
7 To avoid regression results being influenced by outliers, we eliminate from the estimation sample munici-
palities with values of the dependent variable above 100%, on average, which represent less than 0.5% of 
the sample.
8 All analyses reported herein also were run using total budget surplus (including interest payments); the 
results are virtually the same and available upon request.
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Table 1 shows that the mean primary budget surplus in the sample is 2.21%.9 Additionally, 
in the last part of the analyses, we investigate the determinants of stronger or weaker fiscal 
discipline by looking at revenues and expenditures separately. In that case we compute the 
dependent variable as the logarithm of revenues or expenditures per capita. That transfor-
mation allows us to interpret the effects of the relevant variables in percentage terms.10
3.4  Identification and forcing variable
To overcome the problems of endogeneity and selection bias associated with OLS, we look 
at close elections and make use of a regression discontinuity design, or RDD (Imbens and 
Lemieux 2008; Hahn et al. 2001; Lee and Card 2008; Brollo and Nannicini 2012; Petters-
son-Lidbom 2008; Leigh 2008; Ferreira and Gyourko 2007; Folke 2014; Curto-Grau et al. 
2012; Casas-Arce and Saiz 2014). A RDD takes advantage of the fact that the probability 
of being a single-party majority government changes discontinuously at a certain cut-off 
point of the assignment variable. In our case, the forcing variable is the majority margin for 
the party receiving the most votes on Election Day.11
We define the majority margin as the share of votes that the winning party obtained 
above or below the minimum vote share required to rule on its own in a single-party major-
ity government, i.e., 50% + 1 of the councillors. The probability of having a single-party 
majority government, P(M), changes from zero to one when marginit = 0. Below zero, the 
winning party has to negotiate an agreement with other parties in a legislative or govern-
ment coalition to pass legislation and the budget. Above zero, the incumbent party can 
form a single-party majority government and will not need the support of other parties 
to pass the budget. Around the threshold, however, we can treat the single-party major-
ity status of governments as occurring randomly. Thus, by looking at both sides of that 
sharp cut-off one can isolate exogenous variation and estimate the causal effect of having a 
single-party majority on the outcome of interest.
For the just-described strategy to be valid, we need a key identifying assumption that is 
standard in RDD: nothing else besides the single-party majority status changes at the cutoff 
point (Lee 2008; Imbens and Lemieux 2008). In other words, the forcing variable cannot 
be manipulated and selection into single-party majorities is not endogenous. The recent 
literature examining the United States has shown that those assumptions are not always 
met and that, in many cases, electoral outcomes in close races are imbalanced around the 
threshold that defines victory (Caughey and Sekhon 2011; Snyder, et al. 2012). We believe 
that such concerns are not directly applicable to our case because we study a proportional 
representation system in which the margin that defines who is the winning candidate in 
terms of vote share is not the same margin that defines whether a coalition is formed or not. 
Nevertheless, we take the recent criticisms into account for close election designs in two 
ways. First, we acknowledge that the validity of the regression discontinuity design can-
not be taken for granted and must be evaluated case by case. We therefore provide a bat-
tery of checks to test the validity of the identifying assumptions and to eliminate concerns 
9 The average surplus partially is a result of municipalities’ revenues being partially dependent on real 
estate taxes, which during the first half of the 2000s decade were very profitable for Spanish municipalities.
10 We also have run the models using the levels of revenues and expenditures per capita finding similar 
results.
11 The RDD method limits our ability to generalize to cases that lie farther away from the threshold; we are 
able to estimate only the local average treatment effect at the cutoff point. In addition, RDD requires large 
sample sizes.
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regarding covariate imbalance and selection into the treatment. Secondly, we follow the 
recommendations of Snyder et al. (2012), who show that potential imbalances, when they 
exist, can be addressed in parametric specifications that adopt linear or polynomial control 
functions. We estimate the regression discontinuity model with flexible control functions 
and using different empirical approaches; we find that our results are very robust.
To calculate the majority margin—our forcing variable—we compute the share of votes 
that would change the status of the government (turning a single-party majority govern-
ment into a coalition or vice versa). That approach relies on two assumptions: vote trans-
fers to change the seat distribution come from or go to the abstention and they affect only 
the two most voted parties—the rest keep their votes and seats constant. This means that to 
calculate how many votes are needed to move from a coalition to a single-party majority, 
we compute the amount of votes the most voted party needs to mobilize from the absten-
tion to have a single-party majority. Likewise, to calculate how many votes are needed to 
move from a single-party majority to a coalition, we calculate how many votes the second 
most voted party would need to mobilize from the abstention to be able to form an alterna-
tive government.
Any operationalization of the majority margin requires assumptions about vote trans-
fers of the same sort—for other examples, see Solé-Ollé and Viladecans-Marsal (2013) or 
Curto-Grau et al. (2012). In practical terms a value of − 0.01 for our majority vote margin 
variable would imply that the most voted party would have needed 1% more votes to be 
able to form a single-party majority government. A value of 0.01 implies that if the second 
party had increased its vote share by 1% points, the municipality would have had a govern-
ing coalition instead of the single-party majority that we observe. In the Online Appendix, 
we run two robustness checks with alternative forcing variables. The results with these 
alternative specifications of the forcing variables remain the same.
3.5  Econometric specifications
To ensure that inferences are not driven by model misspecification (Lee and Lemieux 
2010, p. 4), we estimate the effect of single-party majorities at the discontinuity point using 
both non-parametric and parametric estimators.
For our non-parametric model, we use local linear regressions. That is equivalent to 
running regressions restricting the sample to observations within a certain interval [− h, h] 
of the forcing variable around the cut-point. In particular, we estimate a series of regres-
sions of the type:
In Eq. (1), the vector of covariates, Xit is not necessary for the effect of single-party majori-
ties to be identified correctly, but as pointed by Imbens and Lemieux (2008), entering 
covariates eliminates small-sample biases and improves the precision of the estimates. As 
we should not see significant changes in the estimate of the effect of single-party majorities 
when covariates are entered, we report results from all models with and without them. In 
the specifications with covariates, X includes the population of the municipality, a right-
wing government dummy, a left-wing government dummy,12 population density, the age 
(1)
Yi = 훼 + 훽0single partymajorityit + 훽1marginit + 훽2marginit ∗ single partymajorityit + 휃Xit + eit
12 The left-wing dummy includes incumbencies of the three main left parties during the sample period: 
Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), Izquierda Unida (IU) and Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 
(ERC). The right-wing governments include the Partido Popular (PP), Convergencia i Uniò (CiU) and Par-
376 Public Choice (2018) 175:367–391
1 3
structure (percentages of the population between 15 and 65 years old), and the unemploy-
ment rate. We select the interval [− h, h] using Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and 
Calonico et al. (2014) optimal bandwidths.13
We also run parametric regressions in which we draw upon all observations in the 
sample. In that case we estimate a set of models of the following type (Jacob et  al. 
2012):
The function f(marginit) represents the relationship between the assignment variable and 
primary budget surplus. As it is difficult to specify the functional form of that relation over 
the full range of data, we allow flexibility by estimating the model using up to four different 
functional forms (linear, quadratic, cubic and quartic) following Lee and Lemieux (2010).
We also run a battery of interactive models of the following type:
Those models include the interaction term f(marginit)*single-party majorityit, allowing 
both the slope and the intercept to be different on both sides of the cut-off point. That esti-
mating procedure provides model flexibility on each side of the threshold.14
Note that as we have panel data, in Eqs.  (2) and (3), we are able to include a set of 
municipal fixed effects, λi, and an electoral term dummy, γt. Our approach is similar to 
Pettersson-Lidbom (2008). Model (3) removes all unobserved time invariant municipal 
heterogeneity and is, therefore, less subject to bias. In addition, it also allows us to increase 
the robustness of the results, as the non-parametric approach described above draws upon 
variation between municipalities, while these parametric specifications rely on within-
municipality variation.
4  Results
In this section, we present our main results and the main robustness analyses. We start by 
discussing the results of the graphical and non-parametric analysis. Secondly, we show the 
results of the parametric analysis. Then we investigate the mechanism that explains the 
impact of single-party majorities on budget surpluses.
4.1  Graphical and non‑parametric analysis
Figure 1 shows our benchmark result in a simple graph. The y-axis represents budget 
surplus, as a percentage of revenues, while the x-axis represents our forcing variable 
(2)Yi = 훼 + 훽0single partymajorityit + f
(
marginit
)
+ 휃Xit + 휆i + 훾t + eit
(3)
Yi =훼 + 훽0single partymajorityit + f
(
marginit
)
+ f
(
marginit
)
∗ single partymajorityit + 휃Xit + 휆i + 훾t + 휀it
13 These are calculated following Calonico et al. (2015).
14 See, for instance, Lee (2001) or Gerber et al. (2011).
Footnote 12 (continued)
tido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV), which are the three main right-wing parties that held incumbencies at the 
municipality level in Spain during the period. The omitted category consists of other parties that do not fit 
within these two categories. These parties tend to be very small, regionalist or local parties, and many of 
them do not have a clear ideological stance.
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(majority margin). We plot two local polynomial regressions estimated on both sides 
of the threshold that determines the change from a coalition (left side) to a single-party 
majority (right side) government. That status changes when the majority margin takes 
value 0, which is shown by the vertical line. The dots are the average surplus of the 
municipalities in each of the bins within that majority margin interval. We found similar 
results using a variety of different bandwidths. Our main result is illustrated by the dis-
continuous jump in budget surplus right at the threshold. Figure 1 shows a discontinuity 
in primary budget surplus right at the cutoff point where the government changes from 
a coalition to a single-party majority. That discontinuity is statistically significant as 
shown by the lack of overlapping of the 90% confidence intervals plotted on both sides 
of the threshold. The magnitude of the discontinuity is approximately 1.1% points. That 
also is an economically relevant difference, as the mean surplus in the whole sample 
is 2.2. As a benchmark, Roubini and Sachs (1989) found in their classical study that, 
compared to a single-party majority government, a coalition government could reduce 
budget surpluses by between 0.5 and 1% of GDP.
We then conducted a placebo test to check that the detected discontinuity happens 
exactly at the point where a single-party majority government can be formed and not 
at other thresholds where a party cannot form a government majority on its own. Fig-
ure 2 presents these graphical tests. In each test, we estimate the same local polynomial 
regressions as in Fig. 1, but for fictitious thresholds constructed arbitrarily at 2, 4, − 2, 
and − 4% margin. The graph shows no statistically significant effects on fiscal surpluses 
at other placebo thresholds. The only discontinuity that is significant is at a 0% margin. 
We take this as evidence that the estimated effect happens exactly at the cutoff point 
where a government changes to a single-party majority.
Fig. 1  Effect of single-party majority governments at the discontinuity point. Notes (1) The y-axis plots 
Primary Surplus, which is defined as the difference between total revenues and total expenditures (exclud-
ing interest payments on debt) in each municipality as a percentage of total revenues. (2) The dots are bin 
averages. (3) The solid line represents a first-order polynomial regression. (4) The shaded area represents 
90% confidence intervals
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The figures are useful in providing visual pictures of the change-of-government effect; 
however, in order to estimate a more precise size of the discontinuity at the cutoff, we 
conducted a formal non-parametric analysis of the local average treatment effect. As 
Jacob et al. (2012) argue, such a strategy views the estimation of treatment effects as local 
Fig. 2  Placebo tests. Notes (1) The y-axis plots Primary Surplus, which is defined as the difference 
between total revenues and total expenditures (excluding interest payments on debt) in each municipality 
as a percentage of total revenues. (2) The dots are bin averages. (3) The solid line represents a first-order 
polynomial regression. (4) The shaded area represents 90% confidence intervals. Each figure represents a 
placebo test at the − 0.04, − 0.02, 0.02, and 0.04 vote margin thresholds
Table 2  Non-parametric regression discontinuity treatment effect (single-party majority government) dep. 
variable: primary surplus (%)
Standard errors in brackets
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
Imbens and Kalyanar-
aman (without 
controls)
Imbens and 
Kalyanaraman (with 
controls)
Calonico et al. 
(without con-
trols)
Calonico et al. 
(with controls)
Optimal bandwidth 1.103* 1.095* 1.17* 1.172*
[0.653] [0.664] [0.685] [0.686]
75% of optimal band-
width
1.255* 1.265* 1.341* 1.363*
[0.739] [0.755] [0.780] [0.779]
125% of optimal band-
width
1.106* 1.094* 1.094* 1.082*
[0.589] [0.597] [0.631] [0.631]
Optimal bandwidth (h) 8.67% 8.67% 7.60% 7.60%
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randomization and limits the analysis to observations that lie within the close vicinity of 
the cutoff point. The analysis allows us to assess the jump from a coalition to a single-party 
majority as if it was randomly assigned in the neighborhood of the known cutoff point 
(majority margin = 0%).
Table 2 displays the results with and without covariates.15 All estimations use clustered 
standard errors by municipality. The results are very consistent and yield a statistically 
significant differential effect on budget surpluses of single-party majority governments. 
Adopting Imbens and Kalyanaraman’s (2012) optimal bandwidth, we find around a 1.1% 
point effect on surplus. The inclusion of controls barely affects the magnitude of the effect. 
Using Calonico et  al.’s estimation (2014) with different bandwidths yields very similar 
results.
Overall both the graphical and the non-parametric analysis show evidence of single-
party majority governments running larger surpluses. However, as we indicated above, 
a crucial assumption underlying the validity of those results is that nothing else besides 
the single-party majority government changes at the same cutoff. Here, we use six con-
trol variables: right-wing government, left-wing government, population, unemploy-
ment rate, age structure, and population density. Some of those variables could correlate 
Fig. 3  Random assignment of pretreatment covariates. Notes (1) The dots are bin averages. (2) The solid 
line represents a first-order polynomial regression. (3) The shaded area represents 90% confidence intervals. 
Each graph represents the jump at the cut-off point for each pre-treatment covariate
15 The estimated coefficients of the control variables in all tables are omitted to save space, but are avail-
able under request from the authors.
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with the government-type variable around the threshold. For instance, conservative gov-
ernments are in principle more likely to favor fiscal discipline than left-wing govern-
ments. If more conservative governments are in the single-party majority group than 
in the coalition group, we could be finding an effect explained by ideology rather than 
governmental type. Similarly, owing to D’Hondt’s rule, larger municipalities are more 
likely to have single-party majority governments because the electoral system gets more 
proportional the larger is city size. As population also determines the different policy 
areas assumed by the municipality, a difference in fiscal stances between single-party 
majorities and coalitions could be explained by size. Likewise, economic conditions 
also are likely to affect both fiscal outcomes and the probability of having a single-party 
majority. Worse economic outcomes may lead to larger budget deficits because of less 
revenues, more social spending and also to less electoral support for the most voted 
party.
Figure 3 shows that all of these pretreatment characteristics are continuous around 
the threshold. The figures illustrate that our regression discontinuity design does a good 
job of randomizing the control variables pre-intervention (i.e., in the first period) around 
the threshold. That conclusion is shown by the continuity of the function and significant 
overlap of the confidence intervals.
Apart from the graphical examination, it is useful to test for imbalances around the 
threshold. Table 3 displays the differences in the means of all covariates between single-
party majority governments and the rest just near the threshold (1% margin on each 
side). A Student’s t test of the difference in means does not allow us to reject the null 
hypothesis that the mean values are the same on both sides of the threshold for the full 
set of control variables. We also tested formally the validity of the RDD design with 
density histograms and McCrary’s (2008) test, finding overall support for it, particularly 
for the samples containing the largest municipalities.
Table 3  Specification test of whether single-party majority government is randomly assigned T tests on 
covariates around the threshold (1% bandwidth)
Standard deviation in brackets
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
Pre-treatment variables Coalitions Single-party majority 
government
Difference
Population 19,027 13,822 5205
[3900.81] [3209.62] [5028.042]
Right incumbent 0.407 0.372 0.034
[0.047] [0.039] [0.060]
Left incumbent 0.495 0.565 − 0.069
[0.047] [0.039] [0.061]
Unemployment 5.117 5.134 − 0.016
[0.203] [0.205] [0.296]
Population density 365.645 395.073 − 29.427
[74.610] [79.689] [113.898]
Population between 15 and 65 33.472 33.595 − 0.123
[0.536] [0.689] [0.907]
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4.2  Parametric specifications
Parametric models improve the non-parametric approach in several ways. First it makes use 
of all observations in the sample and not just those close to the threshold, which increases 
precision. Second, in the non-parametric approach we compared average budget surpluses 
for municipalities on one side of the cutoff point with municipalities on the other side. 
Third, we introduce fixed effects, so that we exploit within-municipality variation instead 
of variation between municipalities. Doing so allows us to control further for unobserved 
characteristics and municipal heterogeneity. Fourth, the parametric approach addresses 
concerns about potential imbalance in covariates by including both linear and flexible con-
trol functions (Caughey and Sekhon 2011; Snyder et al. 2012).
The main results of the parametric model are presented in Table 4. Columns 1–4 display 
the results when we progressively include different polynomial orders of the assignment 
function. Columns 5–8 replicate that procedure, but include the set of polynomial orders 
of the assignment function interacted with governmental status. Therefore, in the first four 
columns we make the conventional assumption that the impact of the majority vote margin 
of the winning party has a similar functional form in coalition and single-party majority 
groups, while in the second set of columns, we allow the effect to vary between groups. For 
the sake of robustness, panel A shows the results of the model without control variables, 
while panel B shows the results including all the controls.
The effect of single-party majority governments always is above conventional levels of 
statistical significance and very stable in magnitude. Columns 1–8 show that the coefficient 
of the variable that captures the treatment status (having a single-party majority govern-
ment) is positive and significant and robust to the use of different polynomial orders on the 
Table 5  Placebo effects on primary surplus (as a percentage of revenues). Fixed effects regression discon-
tinuity. Forcing variable: majority margin
Clustered standard errors in brackets
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
1 2 3 4 5 6
Cutoff Cutoff Cutoff Cutoff Cutoff Cutoff
− 6% − 4% − 2% 2% 4% 6%
Single-party majority government − 0.3695 − 0.17 0.3365 0.0066 − 0.0709 0.0918
[0.454] [0.462] [0.458] [0.472] [0.478] [0.463]
Controls No No No No No No
AIC 35,682.23 35,683.26 35,682.41 35,683.54 35,683.49 35,683.46
Observations 5871 5871 5871 5871 5871 5871
R-squared 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.117
Number of municipalities 3147 3147 3147 3147 3147 3147
Single-party majority government − 0.5928 − 0.3227 0.2059 − 0.0117 − 0.1515 0.0974
[0.459] [0.459] [0.459] [0.469] [0.473] [0.455]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AIC 34,920.02 34,922.35 34,922.97 34,923.39 34,923.16 34,923.3
Observations 5760 5760 5760 5760 5760 5760
R-squared 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.135
Number of municipalities 3076 3076 3076 3076 3076 3076
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assignment variable. The coefficient has a value of around 1.5–1.8 in most specifications. 
Those results imply that municipalities wherein the incumbent government is a single-
party majority (and, thus, does not seek the support of other parties to pass the budget) 
have surpluses around 1.5% points larger than in otherwise similar municipalities in which 
the executive branch is a coalition. The table also shows that additional controls have no 
significant impact on the results.
To check that the effect that we detect is truly an effect of the treatment, Table 5 per-
forms a falsification test analogous to the ones performed for the non-parametric analysis. 
We replicate the linear parametric analysis of Table 4; however, in each column we use 
different values of the assignment variable to construct arbitrary discontinuity thresholds 
not related to a change in the capacity of the winning party to pass the budget on its own. 
We use six arbitrary placebos close to the cutoff point: three on each side of the threshold. 
As each of the discontinuities is “false” we should not expect to see any effect of these 
treatments on the dependent variable if what we were capturing in our model was truly 
the effect of single-party majorities on fiscal surpluses. In none of the 12 placebo regres-
sions is the coefficient of the treatment variable statistically significant. The coefficients are 
erratic and unstable across specifications, changing both in signs and magnitudes, which 
is evidence that the effect of single-party majorities found above appears only at the true 
cutoff point.
Overall, the results of the parametric models confirm that single-party majority govern-
ments run surpluses that are around 1.5% points larger than coalitions do. Again, taking 
into account that the average surplus for the municipalities in our sample is around 2.2%, 
these results point to effects that are economically relevant and similar in magnitude to the 
ones reported in similar studies at the country-level, such as Roubini and Sachs (1989).
We conduct several further robustness checks in the Online Appendix. First, we show 
that the results do not depend on how we define the forcing variable. In the Online Appen-
dix we have estimated the same models of Table 4 using two alternative specifications of 
the forcing variable. The first of them also uses vote shares, but assumes that votes from 
the party in government go to the main opposition party.16 The second one uses as forcing 
variable the number of seats by which the incumbent party is above the minimum needed 
to form a majority government. These analyses in Table A.1 show that the results do not 
depend on how we define the forcing variable. The magnitude of the results always remains 
around 1.3% points in the alternative specification based on vote shares and slightly below 
when the forcing variable is based on seats. Secondly, we replicate the analysis using pri-
mary surplus per capita—instead of as a percentage of revenues—as a dependent variable 
(Table A.2) and obtain significant results in 15 out of 16 estimations. In Tables A.3 and 
A.4 we enter further covariates, such as lagged expenditures, revenues and debt burden; the 
results hold in both magnitude and significance. Finally, Table A.5 shows results when we 
add data from an additional election cycle (2001–2003). In that case, owing to data avail-
ability, we compute the average for this cycle over 3 years. The addition of a third term to 
the analysis does not change the results.
16 We also estimated the models with an interaction between single-party majorities and these two new 
specifications of the forcing variable (in all its polynomial specifications); the results remain the same.
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4.3  Mechanism
We have provided consistent and robust evidence that single-party majority governments 
run larger budget surpluses. In this section, we explore the mechanisms through which 
those effects happen. Traditional theoretical models tend to assume that coalitions are more 
prone to run deficits owing to more public spending. However, deficits also could also be 
a result of lower levels of taxation. The outcome (fiscal deficit) would be the same, but the 
mechanism (and its implications) would be quite different.
To this end, we estimate the same parametric model as in Table 4, but using revenues 
per capita and total expenditures per capita (in logs) as the dependent variables. Such mod-
els allow us to check whether the larger surpluses or smaller deficits run by single-party 
majorities happen through higher taxes, lower expenditures, or a combination of both.
Table 6 shows the results for the expenditures per capita models. Only the two linear 
and non-interactive specifications display a significant coefficient, but the remaining 14 
models do not yield a significant impact of single-party majority governments on spend-
ing levels. Thus, our analyses go against the conventional expectation that coalitions spend 
more in order to satisfy a larger number of constituencies. In fact, all of the coefficients are 
positive, indicating that, if anything, single-party majority governments spend more than 
coalitions do.17
Table 7 displays a similar set of models for revenues per capita. In those estimations, we 
find very consistent positive and significant effects. The coefficient of single-party majori-
ties ranges between 0.028 and 0.045, mostly around 0.035. That estimate means that the 
revenues raised by single-party majorities are approximately 3.5% larger than the rest of 
the Spanish municipal governments in our sample.
Combined, the results of Tables 6 and 7 show that single-party majority governments 
are able to run larger budget surpluses by raising revenues and not by reducing expendi-
tures. To confirm that the effect of single-party majorities on revenues runs through more 
taxation and not from more transfers from higher levels of government, Table 8 replicates 
the analysis separating fiscal revenues and transfers.18 It can be observed there that single-
party majority governments have positive and significant effects on revenues of between 
only 1.8 and 2.5% of the total. We do not find, however, any significant effect of single-
party majority governments on their capacity for obtaining more transfers compared to 
coalition governments. This result suggests that government fragmentation reduces the 
capacity of governments to levy taxes on the electorate to finance public expenditures.
Altogether, our results are consistent with theories arguing that when the incumbent 
party needs the support of other parties—either in a coalition or in the legislature—to pass 
a budget, deficits increase (or surpluses are reduced) to forge an agreement that is accept-
able to all coalition members. However, our results contradict conventional wisdom that 
coalition agreements lead to more public spending. The conventional argument assumes 
that spending can be targeted, while taxation falls equally on all taxpayers, and this would 
explain why spending is the driver of larger deficits. Our results, however, are consistent 
coalitions being more reluctant to face the costs of increasing taxes, even at the expense 
of not being able to target to their constituency as much expenditure as they would prefer. 
Conversely, single-party majority governments seem to be better able to confront the costs 
17 Freier and Odendahl (2012) obtain the same result studying municipalities in Bavaria.
18 For space reasons, the table shows just the non-interactive models, but the results are consistent when we 
enter the interaction terms.
387Public Choice (2018) 175:367–391 
1 3
Ta
bl
e 8
  E
ffe
cts
 of
 m
ajo
rit
y g
ov
er
nm
en
t o
n p
rim
ar
y s
ur
pl
us
 (a
s a
 pe
rc
en
tag
e o
f r
ev
en
ue
s).
 F
ixe
d e
ffe
cts
 re
gr
es
sio
n d
isc
on
tin
ui
ty.
 F
or
cin
g v
ar
iab
le:
 m
ajo
rit
y m
ar
gi
n
Cl
us
ter
ed
 st
an
da
rd
 er
ro
rs 
in
 br
ac
ke
ts
**
*p
 <
 0.
01
; *
*p
 <
 0.
05
; *
p <
 0.
1
Fi
sc
al 
re
ve
nu
es
Re
ve
nu
es
 fr
om
 tr
an
sfe
rs
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Li
ne
ar
Qu
ad
ra
tic
Cu
bi
c
Fo
ur
th
 po
ly
no
m
ial
Li
ne
ar
Qu
ad
ra
tic
Cu
bi
c
Fo
ur
th
 po
ly
no
m
ial
Si
ng
le-
pa
rty
 m
ajo
rit
y g
ov
er
nm
en
t
0.0
21
2*
*
0.0
22
1*
0.0
20
7*
0.0
25
6*
0.0
05
3
0.0
03
7
0.0
00
9
0.0
09
8
[0
.01
0]
[0
.01
2]
[0
.01
2]
[0
.01
3]
[0
.01
0]
[0
.01
2]
[0
.01
2]
[0
.01
3]
Co
nt
ro
ls
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
AI
C
− 
92
09
.61
− 
92
07
.65
3
− 
92
11
.14
9
− 
92
11
.71
8
− 
90
06
.33
7
− 
90
04
.47
8
− 
90
24
.33
7
− 
90
30
.72
9
Ob
se
rv
ati
on
s
58
71
58
71
58
71
58
71
58
71
58
71
58
71
58
71
R-
sq
ua
re
d
0.0
22
0.0
22
0.0
23
0.0
23
0.4
99
0.4
99
0.5
01
0.5
02
Nu
m
be
r o
f m
un
ici
pa
lit
ies
31
47
31
47
31
47
31
47
31
47
31
47
31
47
31
47
Si
ng
le-
pa
rty
 m
ajo
rit
y g
ov
er
nm
en
t
0.0
18
5*
*
0.0
22
0*
*
0.0
21
6*
*
0.0
24
1*
*
0.0
05
4
0.0
04
8
0.0
02
5
0.0
10
8
[0
.00
9]
[0
.01
0]
[0
.01
0]
[0
.01
1]
[0
.01
0]
[0
.01
2]
[0
.01
2]
[0
.01
3]
Co
nt
ro
ls
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
AI
C
− 
10
,97
5.5
8
− 
10
,97
4.4
5
− 
10
,97
3.0
5
− 
10
,97
1.9
8
− 
90
04
.73
− 
90
02
.74
9
− 
90
19
.45
9
− 
90
24
.96
3
Ob
se
rv
ati
on
s
57
60
57
60
57
60
57
60
57
60
57
60
57
60
57
60
R-
sq
ua
re
d
0.3
07
0.3
07
0.3
07
0.3
07
0.5
15
0.5
15
0.5
17
0.5
17
Nu
m
be
r o
f m
un
ici
pa
lit
ies
30
76
30
76
30
76
30
76
30
76
30
76
30
76
30
76
388 Public Choice (2018) 175:367–391
1 3
of raising more revenue to finance the policies that will make the re-election more likely. 
These mechanisms—which our empirical evidence support—have been overlooked by the 
previous empirical literature.
5  Conclusion
Using data from Spanish municipalities for the period 2003–2010, this paper shows that 
single-party majority governments run more balanced budgets. Our results support a large 
theoretical literature providing estimates that have a causal interpretation. We show that 
single-party majority governments in Spain run budgets with an average surplus 1.5% 
points larger governed by coalition agreements. Those differences are economically signifi-
cant and robust to several model specifications.
We also have explored the mechanism that leads to smaller budget deficits or larger 
budget surpluses. Contrary to common expectations, we do not find evidence that single-
party majority governments spend less than coalitions. In fact, our results show that, if any-
thing, single-party majority governments tend to spend more than coalitions. That result, 
however, is not robust to the inclusion of control variables. The explanation for smaller def-
icits is found on the revenue side of the budget. Single-party majority governments raise, 
on average, 2% more fiscal revenues per capita than coalitions.
Our results open up new paths for future research. We have shown that single-party 
majority governments run smaller budget deficits than coalitional governments. However, 
we have not distinguished among types of coalitions in our control group. The control 
group herein comprised all governments under which municipal budget decision-making 
requires the agreement of more than one political party. The available data did not allow 
us to differentiate between formal government coalitions or minority governments that rely 
on a legislative coalition that allows the incumbent party to approve the budget. Future 
research should look into coalition governments in finer detail and analyze the extent to 
which the type of coalition matters. Such research would allow investigating Edin and 
Ohlsson’s (1991) claims, which argues that it is minority governments, and not formal coa-
lition governments, that lead to larger budget deficits. In a similar vein, we have drawn a 
distinction between single-party governments and coalitions without considering the num-
ber of parties that form the coalition. If the law of 1/N holds, we should expect that coali-
tions formed by a large number of parties should overspend more than coalitions with only 
two members. This hypothesis deserves further empirical research.
The results of the paper likewise can be extended by studying differences in fiscal 
budget cycles. The analyses provided here are drawn from mean budget balances over 
4-year electoral terms. A more complete explanation would ask whether both types of gov-
ernments behave differently over their full terms in office, or just in certain years. It could 
be that coalitions run larger deficits only in election years, while budgets are closer to bal-
ance during the remainders of their terms.
Finally, we have dealt only with aggregate effects on budget balances. We have not 
considered the possibility that coalitions lead to changes in certain types of expenditures, 
taxes, or both. Likewise, future research should look to the more long-term effects of gov-
ernment fragmentation. Budgets, deficits and debts evolve and accumulate over time, so 
new research should bring in a more dynamic focus for analyzing the effects of government 
fragmentation on fiscal outcomes. We believe that the results reported in this paper are a 
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step forward in answering those questions and contribute to a better understanding of the 
political determinants of budget surpluses and deficits.
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